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Faithful Presence and Theological
Jurisprudence: A Response to
James Davison Hunter
Zachary R. Calo*
This paper considers how James Hunter’s arguments, presented both in
his address1 and his book To Change the World,2 might inform the
development of a constructive religious legal theory based in the particular
resources of Christian theology. In speaking of religious legal theory, I
mean something quite different than a theory of law and religion. For some
time, the academic conversation about law and religion has centered around
issues concerning church-state relations and, more broadly, the place of
religion within the liberal political order. Yet, the regnant methodological
concerns that have shaped this discourse reflect the boundedness of law to a
modern secular imaginary. This being the case, pulling theology into deeper
conversation with legal thought will require freeing law from its lingering
state of captivity. Hunter’s work is particularly useful in this groundclearing task because it offers a dense critique of the sociological
assumptions that have shaped legal modernity. While his concern is not
with religious legal theory as such, Hunter’s normative account of Christian
being in the world, captured most fully in the idea of faithful presence,
contains important resources for developing a model of Christian
engagement with law.
Hunter proposes that we now inhabit a “late modern, post-secular
world.”3 Post-secularity, as Hunter defines it, involves “the empirically
undeniable persistence of religion in the late modern world, the recognition

* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. This is a response to
James Davison Hunter’s Law, Religion and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1065 (2013), and a
part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?
1. James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1065
(2013).
2. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD (2010).
3. Hunter, supra note 1, at 1069.
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of the limits of secular epistemology and reason, and the ethical puzzles and
political quandaries these developments pose.”4 Perhaps most importantly
for the purposes of this paper, Hunter also sees late modern post-secularity
finding expression through “an intensifying and unstable pluralism.”5 This
pluralism is particularly challenging and unsettling because it not only raises
the specter of difference, but deep “moral and metaphysical differences” that
implicate how communities understand the nature of humanity and indeed
the cosmos.6 Radical tension at such an elemental level means that
difference cannot be “absorbed” and thus tests “the limits of tolerable
diversity.”7 Under such conditions, the very possibility of achieving even
thin consensus about the meaning of “collective identity” and the common
good is called into question.8
The moral and metaphysical pluralism of late modern society is a central
problem for thinking about law in its relationship to religion. Law, Hunter
writes, “is the language of the state and thus, by its very nature as a language
it . . . defines a particular reality—not least, the normative reality of what the
state will allow and not allow.”9 In other words, law is densely normative in
a way that “goes beyond particular statutes and codes.”10 It is an expression
of culture that reflects how a community constructs and understands reality.
However, in the absence of any shared moral framework within which to
derive law’s meaning, law becomes a device for imposing normativity
against the chaotic pluralism of cultural dissension.11 As Hunter argues, law
now “does the work that social mores used to do, and as a consequence, law
and policy become the predominant framework for understanding collective
life and addressing its problems.”12 Law becomes a “weapon” in the culture
war whose “patronage” is sought “by all parties.”13
Hunter is right to point out the challenges that pluralism has created for
law. However, the problem of pluralism does not merely concern law’s role
in the culture war. The effects of moral and metaphysical pluralism go even
deeper, for these same dynamics also pose a frontal challenge to the very
logic and coherence of legal modernity as it finds expression in claims to
universalism. Viewed from this perspective, the post-secular is even more
foundationally destabilizing than Hunter’s argument reveals. Post-secularity
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not only makes law the object of capture by particular interests—it negates
the very idea that law possesses a universal foundation and meaning.
The jurisprudential implications of post-secularity cannot be assessed
apart from considering modernity’s negation of religion as a source of legal
authority.
Legal universality, as it took shape within the modern
imagination, rested on the severing of law from religion.14 The secular, in
Hunter’s words, was deemed to be “rational, universal, cosmopolitan and
tolerant,” whereas religion was irrational, particularistic, and the genesis of
conflict and violence.15 As such, recasting law as the product of a selfcontained and autonomous logic offered a way to establish a universal
jurisprudence removed the shadows of a theological economy. This
desacralization of law included the separation of church and state, but the
essence of legal modernity was the deeper ontological separation of law and
religion at the conceptual level of legal meaning. From this perspective, late
modern post-secularity is destabilizing because it undermines the moral
foundations of this modern legal project. Recent debate about legal
pluralism, concurrent jurisdiction, and religious courts are but one prominent
manifestation of the collapsing architecture of the secular legal order.
As important as these developments have been, it is significant to note
the many ways in which legal modernity has also proven resistant and
resilient. Law remains deeply tethered to the logic of modernity, unable to
fully break the bonds of a secular ontology. As Hunter revealingly notes,
“the acids of modernity and late modernity have eroded the capacity to
believe in the old gods, but they have not diminished the need to believe in
something.”16 And law is one of the things for which belief continues. In
fact, nothing more captures this impulse than the central role of human rights
discourse within modern politics. The universal claims of secular human
rights, resting on a thick moral anthropology, remain one of the final
expressions of the modern order. Post-secularity has fractured law, but it
has not penetrated the legal imagination as completely as Hunter intimates.
In light of this situation, I want to propose that Christian theological
jurisprudence must begin its constructive work by advancing a more
complete and authentic post-secular turn in law. Hunter is right to point to
the ways in which post-secularity has problematized the relationship
between law and religion, but while Hunter focuses on the challenges of
post-secular pluralism, I want to instead explore the opportunities to which it
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gives rise. In particular, post-secularity has revealed the inability of a
modern ontology to ground and explain legal norms. Under the guise of a
secular logic that purported to move beyond religion, legal modernity merely
piggybacked on the residue of Christian culture. While this arrangement
endured for some time, the post-secular postmodern condition represents the
exhaustion of this possibility and the collapses of legal modernity into
struggle and ressentiment. Legal modernity is thus revealed to have been a
dependent tradition that subsisted on inherited intellectual and cultural
capital. The lingering modernism of legal thought needs to be pushed to its
logical end in collapse through a more complete severing of the connection
between law and secularism. The issue is no longer whether there should be
more or less secularism, but rather how to give law meaning within a
cultural environment where there is no possibility of deep moral consensus.
If, as William Connolly writes, “[t]he historical modus vivendi called
secularism is coming apart at the seams,” there is a need and opportunity to
think anew about law’s relationship to theology.17 From within rubbles of
modernity, theology might now offer itself as an alternative to the secular
jurisprudential imaginary. This reconstructive task is not for theology alone,
though it might be the case that theology has a distinct and foundationally
important role in conceptualizing the meaning of law after secular
modernity.
The central challenge in developing a theological jurisprudence is to
determine its shape and aims as it finds voice within the social space
afforded by pluralism. The position I want to advance is that the orientation
of theological jurisprudence must be at once radical and modest. It is radical
in that it aims to push beyond the ontological presumptions that have shaped
modern legal thought. Against modernity’s false and violent universalism,
theological jurisprudence presents Christianity as the true story of law. At
the same time, theological jurisprudence must resist the violence of
advancing a univocal account of law in a culture devoid of any common
cultural basis. This is a difficult balance to maintain, but Hunter’s account
of faithful presence developed in To Change the World offers important
resources for doing so.18
At the heart of faithful presence is the proposition that the “incarnation
is the only adequate reply to the challenges of dissolution; the erosion of
trust between word and world and the problems that attend it.”19 From this
flows the additional claim that “it is the way the Word became incarnate in
Jesus Christ and the purposes to which the incarnation was directed that are

17.
18.
19.
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the only adequate reply to challenge of difference.”20 Against the violent
and fragmented reality of the late modern world, faithful presence marks a
way of being and living that resists and subverts the will to power.21 Rather
than seeking to change the world, faithful presence calls on the church to
inhabit the world through an embodied and enacted commitment to human
flourishing.22
One manifestation of faithful presence is moving away from a focus on
law and politics in order that the church might “disentangle” itself “from the
life and identity of American society.”23 Faithful presence does not demand
a total withdrawal from law. To the contrary, Hunter argues that an
alternative to the “present impasse . . . will not be found without the creative
role of the law,” for law is needed to create “space where culture, in its
generative capacities, is free to do its work.”24 At the same time, the role of
law within Hunter’s system is largely negative.25 At best, law creates and
preserves space for culture, which is the proper situs for Christian
engagement with justice and the common good.
Against the view of law as more of a problem than a solution to the
present impasse, I want to argue that faithful presence also contains
resources for advancing a constructive Christian engagement with law-qualaw. Perhaps Hunter’s failure to move in this direction reflects his defining
of law in terms of the exercise of power. It is certainly the case that the
essence of law is power. As Robert Cover famously observed, “[l]egal
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”26 But law is not
merely about the exercise of power but equally about conceptualizing the
place and meaning of power within a moral system. By focusing almost
exclusively on the former, Hunter conflates law with politics, treating them
both as agents of the state that offer “an unstable and unsustainable
foundation for any social order.”27
Hunter is certainly right in urging Christians to reassess their
relationship to the violent expressions of law, but an equally important task

20. Id. (italics removed).
21. Id. at 280.
22. Id. at 279.
23. Id. at 184.
24. Hunter, supra note 1, at 1082.
25. On the negative and positive dimension of legal universalism, see Rowan Williams, Civil
and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective, 10 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 262, 271–72
(2008).
26. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
27. Hunter, supra note 1, at 1082.
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for Christians is to shape the moral imaginary by which law is given
meaning within the present cultural moment. In other words, the task is not
simply to be faithfully present within a culture fragmented by law’s
violence, but to also pursue the more basic task of advancing an account of
law that moves beyond the violent logic of late modernity. The primary
problem is not with power as such, but with a lack of cultural resources for
understanding and properly exercising it.
Pursuing this aspect of faithful presence is above all the work of
constructive theology. At its most basic, it requires the development of what
Rowan Williams terms a “theology of law.”28 Yet, it equally demands that
this theology be culturally contextualized so as to offer a response to the
particular jurisprudential challenges confronting late modern secular culture.
I would here propose that the task of a Christian theological jurisprudence is
nothing less than to redeem legal logic from modernity’s ontological
separation by relocating law and law’s meaning within a theological
economy. If, as Hunter proposes, the incarnation represents the only
adequate Christian response to the dissolution of modern moral order, then
the reconstitution of law must equally be grounded in an incarnational
worldview that sees the naturalness of law as oriented towards, and finally
consummated in, grace.
A jurisprudence of faithful presence undercuts the violence of moral and
metaphysical pluralism by testifying to the ultimate univocity of legal
meaning. Above all, it sees law as grounded necessarily in a basic act of
trust in the meaningfulness of creation and the possibility of justice. This
trust marks the beginning of the possibility of law responding to the
brokenness of humanity. Yet, such trust cannot be fostered by a modern
order that locates law within what Robert Jenson calls a “world without a
story.”29 Christianity alone can thus prevent the collapse of law into
violence and denigration by establishing the coherence between what Hunter
terms “word and world.”30 In theological jurisprudence, word and world
meet in the incarnate Word.
At the same time that theological jurisprudence offers a totalizing
alternative to established modes of modern legal thought, it must equally be
defined by a modesty about what can and ought be reasonably accomplished
within a pluralistic order. The univocity of law to which theological
jurisprudence points participates in the violence it endeavors to resist. This
problem is, to some extent, endemic to law itself, for law is necessarily
located within the brokenness and violence of the world. It cannot escape

28. Williams, supra note 25, at 272.
29. See Robert W. Jenson, How the World Lost Its Story, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1993, at 19,
available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/03/how-the-world-lost-its-story.
30. HUNTER, supra note 2, at 241 (italics removed).
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the moral ambiguities of politics. Yet, if law begins with brokenness—what
James Boyd White describes as “the deep uncertainties of the world”—then
faithful presence begins with living into the tensions to which this
brokenness gives rise.31 This is not an act of despair and resignation but of
hope grounded in an elusive peace. Faithful presence in law is thus less
about transforming law than about imaging and embodying its meaning
made anew. This is not an act of power that aims to change the world so
much as a silent openness to surprise and possibility, for the regeneration of
law is a process that is always at once incomplete. The vocation of
Christians is not to capture law for the good but to be present in it, as in all
creation, opposing those “frameworks of social life that are incompatible
with the shalom for which we were made and to which we are called.”32

31.
32.

JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 196 (2006).
HUNTER, supra note 2, at 235.

1089

DO NOT DELETE

1/9/13 2:34 PM

***

1090

